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Abstract — The main purpose of the study is an attempt to answer the ques-
tion about the evils of everyday life and an analysis of the possibility to indicate 
a code or codes of rules that will allow the regulation of social life. The article 
is based on an analysis of selected texts by Leszek Kołakowski — mainly on «Ethics 
without Code» and «Education for hatred». 
For Kołakowski philosophy is not a profession, it is a vocation, which simply 
means that philosophy is not for him, but he is for philosophy and that it was 
not him who chose, but he was chosen by philosophy and thus became his fate. 
The paper begins with the introduction and a brief analysis of evil both contem-
porary as well as in ancient times; then the author tries to bring closer the views 
of Polish philosopher on human nature and the possibility of constructing moral 
codecs to be a beacon for the community. The summary of this article is the con-
clusion that the best possible ethical approaches is «ethics without codes».
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1.  Introduct ion
The main theme of Kołakowski’s accomplishments, regardless 
of the stage of his work, was man and his behavior in the world of 
culture. As Gesine Schwan mentions, Kołakowski has always been 
interested in «a specific person in a specific social situation, not 
only what it is in reality, but [...] as it should be should be»( Schwan 
1971: 40). The aim of the paper is an attempt to provide answers 
to issues of evil manifestations in daily life, and to analyse pos-
sibilities of suggesting codes or sets of rules useful in regulating 
social life. It seems that no one could more accurately compre-
hend the issue of morality, not just by definitions and attempts to 
describe it, but by reference to ethical responsibility for the world 
in which we live, the world that we embrace from birth. We can, 
of course, reject this notion, but this would be suicidal. However, 
having decided to remain in this world, which most of us did, one 
should be aware that this is tantamount to consenting to a world 
of hate, suffering, exploitation and violence. Since we are con-
stituent parts of it, we can neither reject nor accept it only partly. 
It is true that there are some activities that can be accomplished 
partially, e. g., smoking a cigarette or part repayment of debts. 
However, there are such life activities, where partial accomplish-
ment is not permissible, rather they can be fully performed or 
not at all for example, one cannot partially jump out of the train, 
marry, or die. According to Kołakowski such activities also include 
our acceptance of the world. The article is based on an analysis of 
selected Leszek Kołakowski’s texts, especially his «Ethics without 
a code» (1962), «Education for hatred» (1977), and several recent 
texts including «Mini lectures on Maxi issues», or «If God does not 
exist... about God, the Devil, Sin and other worries, often referred 
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to as philosophy of religion». However, in the main thrust of the 
analysis will not be based on the chronology of the publications 
chronology, but on the selection of issues that seem timeless.
2.  The Issue оf  Evi l
Psychologists, sociologists as well as philosophers do ask 
questions regarding the origin of evil and its root cause in the 
world around us. Philip Zimbardo in his book «The Lucifer effect. 
Why do good people do evil?» puts it bluntly: «We are afraid of 
evil, but it fascinates us. [...] we are excited when contemplating 
sexual excesses and the violation of moral codes by those who do 
not belong to our kind» (Zimbardo 2013: 28). A study conducted 
in 2013 by Atmedia shows a picture of Poles who are much more 
enthusiastic about murder programs than cooking, sports or mu-
sic programs. However, the human delight in watching the suf-
fering of others and in the widely understood evil has a very long 
history. In ancient Rome people were attracted to the crucifix-
ion, gladiatorial combats and hunting, fighting and implement-
ing sentences with the use of animals. One of the most popular 
shows in Rome was that in which wild beasts tore bodies nailed 
to the cross, with the audience relishing the sight of dropping 
body parts. Medieval Europe was not more ethical; some even 
suggest expanding and enriching the repertoire of public spec-
tacles of cruel chastisements and executions. The most popular 
sentences were punishing criminals by means of the garrotte, the 
rack, stripping of skin, evisceration or cooking in boiling water. 
Each type of punishment was accompanied by events or funfairs. 
King Louis XVI was, on January 21, 1793 at the Revolution Square 
in Paris, beheaded in presence of hundreds of thousands of visi-
tors. A description of the torture and execution of King Henry’s IV 
murderer, François Ravaillac, which is set in the book, «About the 
cruelty», by Mariana Zdziechowski is chilling. The few fragments 
cited herewith, show how cruel people can be in inflicting suffer-
ing. «On the day of the execution, the morning started the tor-
ture. In the afternoon, [...] he [Ravaillac] stood on the scaffold with 
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the dagger, with which he had murdered the King, in his right 
hand; This hand was burned to simmer until charring; the body 
was pulled with hot pincers, the wounds were covered over with 
molten lead, burning tar, boiling oil, sulfur and wax. Finally, then 
came the quartering: horses worked a half an hour stretching and 
tearing the body. At the end of this, the crowd ran behind a bar-
rier, where human abomination was manifested in all its fullness; 
women were seen digging their teeth into such bodies often with 
quarrels about choosing which remnant of the torn body, as ev-
eryone wanted just a piece for themselves» (Zdziechowski 1993: 
42–43). 
This description is not a figment of imagination of a sick man, 
but unfortunately the documentary of the events that took place 
in 1610 (Stecko 2011). Nowadays, are we less hungry for enter-
tainment associated with cruelty and violations of the principles, 
characteristic of our culture. Optimism, at this point, seems to be 
little justified. A quick glance at the statistics and the number of 
games with the cruel execution of American reporter, James Fol-
ey, which took place a few months ago1 would serve as pointers. 
Servers were blocked due to the unexpected number of those in-
terested in the gruesome views of the head being cut off from the 
rest of the body.
Does the view of Kołakowski seem to be right when the evil 
of modern times is compared with that which became part of 
our often disgraceful history? This, unfortunately, seems to be 
the case. Kołakowski as a historian, who critically looked into past 
history, did not spot any difference between the demonic evil of 
hundreds or even thousands of years past, and of the present. Ac-
cording to the thinker, neither were the chances of survival in the 
Roman lead mines of Sardinia higher than in Auschwitz, nor the 
invasions of the Huns or Mongols gentler than those by Hitler.
1 In August 2014 the Islamic jihadists published the video with the en-
forcement of American journalist James Foley and two months later 
a video of the execution of a French tourist.
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3.  Modern Man аnd His Nature
Leszek Kołakowski, inspired by Pascal, also tries to answer the 
key question of who we really are and what the human nature is. 
Modern man still continues his run away from loneliness, to avoid 
being alone with his thoughts; we carry «pocket transistor radios 
to avoid being surprised at any one moment without a company» 
(Kołakowski 2003: 105). Moreover, we are unable to create what 
Kołakowski calls «real community». The community sought after 
in antagonistic situations, in moments of suffering or emotional 
tension. This means that we can much more readily participate in 
a group that is starring at the playground, but find it much more 
difficult to ride in a crowded bus. A society that thrives on non-
intrusion in a lax environment soon dies away in an increasingly 
strict situations. 
It is also characteristic that modern man is opposed to the 
cult of suffering. Being safe from suffering is worth any price. One 
can observe panic-stricken avoidance of suffering, which is mani-
fested not only in the sphere of physical ailments, but worse still, 
in the field of inter-personal relationships. Kołakowski notes that 
we avoid anticipating death, not for the purpose of comprehend-
ing it but to push it beyond the realms of our attention. We avoid 
love, by imposing on ourselves forced cynicism, being afraid 
of any risks that may result in suffering, but resort to conform-
ism which we impose on our relatives, «[...] the fearf of specter 
of misery, alienation from the environment which makes it re-
ally difficult to believe that a man’s attempt at self-constitution 
is surpassing conformity» (Kołakowski 2003: 105). The culture 
which exhibits such a huge reluctance to suffering is termed by 
Kołakowski the culture of analgesics.
Today’s world is a world without such concepts as God, the 
devil, the original sin, the soul, good, evil, sacred, profane... 
mainly because these concepts have become outdated and un-
fashionable, and what is more, some of them seem so absurd for 
the ideas of enlightenment. However, according to Kołakowski, 
the  image of the world that excludes these rules (Kołakowski 
1988: 234) seem even more absurd. He connects the phenomenon 
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of disappearance of these concepts with the decline of interest 
in religion, but without any indication of what was the origin. 
However, modern man does not even see these changes, as he is 
too busy and intoxicated with «narcotic agents» in his search for 
new «builders of life.» Kołakowski describes it as « life drugging», 
which is a voluntary self-dazing and jamming of one’s conscious-
ness. The effect of these phenomena is the fact that man has lost 
the ability to independently deal with problems, failures, pain, di-
saster, suffering, and even the ability to face life without outside 
help.
One of the manifestations of evil in a given society is the phe-
nomenon of hatred. According to Kołakowski, its noticeable di-
mensions include moral, political or religious aspects. Since moral 
and political party does not contradict each other, it means that 
there are no cases when hatred could be, at the same time, mor-
ally condemned and prescribed as a useful political instrument to 
pave way to a world free of hatred: an instrument that sanctifies 
purpose. However, religious tradition, at least in our cultural cir-
cle, demands more than just resignation from hatred: we ought 
to, in addition, do good to our persecutors, by praying for our en-
emies (Kołakowski 1977).
Man, in the words of Kant, was carved out of a crooked piece 
of wood, so nothing simple can be achieved from it. In man there 
exists a fundamental corruption, which cannot in anyway be erad-
icated. So the issue of whether evil can be completely destroyed 
in the world is identical with that of, if the devil can be saved. This, 
contrary to the belief of Origen and several other thinkers, does 
not seem possible. The devil is not a being hungry of destruction, 
and famine. Kołakowski seems to have no doubt as to the inabil-
ity of complete eradication of evil. Although what we perceive 
in the world makes us optimistic, it is difficult to find any reason 
to conclude that we can eliminate these phenomena, and thus 
also evil. We have observed so many horrible things in this cen-
tury. We can hardly assume that all that wrong has now passed 
away and everything will be fine. «I, however, have the feeling 
that things will not be that fine. I do not want to prophesy of my 
freewill, since it is known that if prophets are not inspired by God, 
they err. So I prefer to err as a prophet of misfortune» (Pawelec 
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2000: 106). Moreover, he opines that the complete elimination of 
evil remains an impossibility.
4.  Ethics Without  the Code
There is, according to Kołakowski, a moment in the life of every 
man when he learns at least three things. The first is the aware-
ness that we live in a world where there is torture and concentra-
tion camps, where people are dying of hunger and cold, where 
twelve-year old prostitutes live, where old men are tortured by 
their children and children are abused by their parents. Second 
is the perception we received this world as a heritage with un-
payable debt burden and mortgage and last but not the least is 
a kind of consciousness that we can abandon it by giving up life. 
If we do not, then we should take responsibility for the world into 
which we were born. As long as we live freely, we through our be-
havior, as well as our conscious or semi-conscious act of consent 
accept the world as it is offered us. Just live — which translates 
to mean acceptance of all the rottenness of the world as our own 
disgrace and rottenness, but recognizing at the same vein that, 
despite the burden the heritage is worth accepting, or that life, 
despite its suffering is worth our involvement (Kołakowski 2009: 
140–141). When we come to the conclusion and, what’s more, 
realize that by living we affirm life, our consciousness bears a li-
ability for the debts of the world. «The refusal to settle ones debts 
takes two ideological forms: it is expressed in, These are two dif-
ferent variations, based on age, of the same mask which requires 
cowardice to avoid responsibility for life» (Kołakowski 2009: 141). 
Although Kołakowski positions his reflections between the two 
extremes, namely conservatism and nihilism, he equally distanc-
es himself from both currents. If nihilism is an attempt of an ap-
parent disagreement with the world, conservatism could be its 
opposite — as an identification of oneself with the contemporary 
world. A nihilist consequently reduces the world to himself, whilst 
a conservative reduces himself to the existing world. Each of us — 
according to Kołakowski constitute a part of the world, accepting 
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it as a correlate of its own existence and as a matter of responsi-
bility we try to describe this situation; similarly as in recognizing 
the irreducible nature of moral decisions which are forced on us. 
As responsible beings, we cannot fail to be interested in the prob-
lems of the modern world, even if they are very distant from us. 
We need to know that all the evil of this world has been caused 
by beings like us. The fact that there is in each of us the seed of 
evil, which we cannot always prevent, we are not without blame, 
even if we are not the perpetrators. We are humans, and its man, 
who perpetrate evil on other people. The desire to have a moral 
code is a component tendency to safety, the avoidance of deci-
sion making. It is, indeed, the desire to live in a world where all 
the decisions have already been made once and for all. Ideally, 
the code should serve as a set of abstract decisions replacing any 
specific decision; it should provide a sufficient condition for each 
settlement, to automatically locate any situation in the world of 
values, that reduces its elements to points on a uniform universal 
scale, to annihilate any field of indecisiveness and to create condi-
tions of certainty. The Code contains all the tips, so we would for 
sure know, under what conditions, in a given situation we could 
be free of guilt, and permit the attainment of this freedom by ac-
tually subjecting oneself to its rules. There is a tendency to get 
hold of an ideal code, which encourages improvements of exist-
ing codes and demands of us the treatment of existing codes as 
ideals accomplished.
Kołakowski, however, does not believe in the codes to be full, 
complete and perfect, saying «[...] no code is really ultimately 
exhausting, but the idea of the code contains a constant striv-
ing towards the achievement of the idea of completeness and, 
therefore such a set of rules that are applicable in any given moral 
situation while prejudicing it likewise. The ideal code is an idea 
of a  perfectly decided system which, in conjunction with the 
description of a situation, can be legally deduced as valuable or 
negated. The code is intended to transform the world of values 
into a crystal landscape, where any value can always be without 
doubt located and identified» (Kołakowski 2009: 153). Kołakowski 
showed how much indecision and doubt arises when we take 
moral principles seriously. Instability and dilemmas accompany 
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us in experiencing our own freedom and relates to persons who 
are not unfamiliar with ethical reflection. As Kołakowski said, 
in moral life there is symmetry of claims and obligations. Moral 
life, according to Kołakowski, is like a world in which there are 
a lot of holes. In patching one of these, we increase another and 
thus rigid rules are a fiction. For each decision, which claims to be 
moral, I bear full responsibility and I never know, and will never 
know whether it was appropriate. This uncertainty makes people 
who are morally valuable feel they are never saints and that saints 
are not always morally valuable.
5.  Conclusions 
For Kołakowski philosophy is not a profession, it is a vocation, 
which simply means that philosophy is not for him, but he is for 
philosophy and that it was not him who chose, but he was chosen 
by philosophy and thus became his fate. Therefore, he is torment-
ed by questions that others are simply curious about, because 
whenever he talks about philosophy, he talks about struggle 
and agony, not creative ecstasies and satisfaction from a job well 
done. It seems that we extremely need such philosophers who 
will sow in us some seeds of doubt, not only because, accord-
ing to Kołakowski, doubt is some sort of defense against evil, but 
because it can weaken the Promethean confidence in ourselves 
(Kołakowski 1982: 157) and also against all kinds of rigid rules and 
codes; but also because it forces us to reflect and consequently 
make us take actions. Of course, one has to remember that this is 
a double-edged sword. Doubt can also be a leaven of evil because 
there does not exist a good rule that cannot be used in a wrong 
way (Kołakowski 1997: 39).
This is so because every idea and human activity can be used 
to unethical practices. However, this conclusion does not call 
for inaction, but rather a more prudent and cautious approach 
that will be specific to the subject of conscious existence of evil. 
Also the proper conclusion seems to be the fact that evil will al-
ways be a challenge for us to which we should respond and try 
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to change since it within our capacity to change. As Kołakowski 
writes «In the world full of hatred, jealousy and vengeance, in the 
world that — not so much because of the nature of poverty but 
rather because of our gargantuan gluttony — seems to us more 
jam-packed, hatred turns out to be one of those evils of which 
are can say cannot be removed by any institutional procedures. 
In  this case, each person is free, without being exposed to ridi-
cule, to presuppose that by taming the evil in himself, contrib-
utes to attempts to subdue it in the world, and so bears in himself 
an uncertain and fragile anticipation of a better life on this ship 
of madmen» (Kołakowski 1977).
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